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Abstract—In-browser cryptojacking involves hijacking the
CPU power of a website’s visitor to perform CPU-intensive
cryptocurrency mining, and has been on the rise, with 8500%
growth during 2017. While some websites advocate cryptojacking
as a replacement for online advertisement, web attackers exploit
it to generate revenue by embedding malicious cryptojacking code
in highly ranked websites. Motivated by the rise of cryptojacking
and the lack of any prior systematic work, we set out to
analyze malicious cryptojacking statically and dynamically, and
examine the economical basis of cryptojacking as an alternative
to advertisement. For our static analysis, we perform content-,
currency-, and code-based analyses. Through the content-based
analysis, we unveil that cryptojacking is a wide-spread threat
targeting a variety of website types. Through a currency-based
analysis we highlight affinities between mining platforms and
currencies: the majority of cryptojacking websites use Coinhive to
mine Monero. Through code-based analysis, we highlight unique
code complexity features of cryptojacking scripts, and use them
to detect cryptojacking code among benign and other malicious
JavaScript code, with an accuracy of ≈96.4%. Through dynamic
analysis, we highlight the impact of cryptojacking on system
resources, such as CPU and battery consumption (in battery-
powered devices); we use the latter to build an analytical model
that examines the feasibility of cryptojacking as an alternative to
online advertisement, and show a huge negative profit/loss gap,
suggesting that the model is impractical. By surveying existing
countermeasures and their limitations, we conclude with long-
term countermeasures using insights from our analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, blockchain-based cryptocurrencies have emerged
as an innovation in distributed systems, enabling a transparent
and distributed storage of transactions. To prevent abuse and
improve trustworthiness in cryptocurrencies, various proof
mechanisms, such as the Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof of
Stake (PoS), are used. In Bitcoin, one of the most prominent
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, for example, PoW is used
to embed trustworthiness in the system. In Bitcoin, new
coins are mined by individual miners through extensive hash
operations, which are then verified by distributed nodes in
a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. However, the use of PoW in
Bitcoin has led to abuse: an adversary may employ various
techniques to abuse public resources for mining purposes and
to perform extensive hash calculations at no or low cost.
One such technique that has emerged recently is called
cryptojacking, which involves outsourcing hash calculations
in PoW-based cryptocurrencies. Cryptojacking is the use of
system resources of a target device to compute hashes and
make profit out of mining without the consent of the target de-
vice’s owner. Conventional cryptojacking involved installation
of a software binary on a target machine that secretly solved
PoW and communicated the results to a remote server [1].
Such conventional cryptojacking required user permission to
download the software and a persistent Internet connection to
communicate the PoW result to the adversary or a dropzone
server controlled by him. However, conventional cryptojacking
proved infeasible for several reasons. First, not all devices have
a persistent Internet connection when needed to send PoW re-
sults; PoWs are time sensitive, and if not sent immediately after
being solved they become easily outdated. Secondly, antivirus
companies can easily identify binaries used for cryptojacking
and detect them [2]. Finally, this form of attack requires an
infection vector, whereby users enable the attack by mistakenly
installing the cryptojacking binaries on their machines.
A recent form of in-browser cryptojacking that does not
suffer from those issues has emerged. In-browser cryptojacking
does not require installing binaries, or authorization from users
to operate the system. In-browser cryptojacking instances use
JavaScript code to compute PoW in web browser and transmit
the PoW to a remote dropzone server [3], [4]. As such, and
since they are shielded in the browser’s process, they are
undetected by the antivirus scanners. Moreover, mining during
web browsing ensures uninterrupted transmission of PoW over
a persistent in-place Internet connection.
Initially intended for good use as an alternative revenue
source to online advertisement [5], in-browser cryptojacking
was made easy by online services such as Coinhive [6], which
provided JavaScript templates for cryptojacking. Coinhive
provides scripts to mine Monero, a cryptocurrency that is hard
to trace, and to reward miners based on the aggregated hashes
they contribute. Google terms search reports for “Cryptojack-
ing”, “Monero”, and “Coinhive” from May 2017 to March
2018 demonstrate the increasing interests in cryptojacking as
a global phenomenon, as shown in Figure 1 (and detailed in
Figure 2). This rise has coincided with the rise in malicious
use of in-browser cryptojacking: more than 32,000 websites
running Coinhive scripts, many of which are the result of
compromise and Coinhive scripts injection, are reported [5].
In-browser cryptojacking serves as an attack avenue for
hackers who inject malicious JavaScript code into popular
websites without the knowledge of website owners and mine
cryptocurrency for themselves. This is known as a cryptojack-
ing attack, and become a major problem recently. According to
Symantec’s latest Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR), cryp-
tojacking attacks on websites rose by 8500% during 2017 [7],
[8]. In February 2018, a major cryptojacking attack hit more
than 4000 websites across the world including the websites
of US Federal Judiciary and the UK National Health Service
(NHS) [9]. Also in February 2018, Tesla became the victim
of a cryptojacking attack in which attackers hijacked Tesla
cloud and deployed their own cryptojacking code [10]. After
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Figure 1: Google search trends for Cryptojacking, Monero,
and Coinhive over the past 10 months. The results have been
normalized in the range [0-100].
such unusual incidents, UK’s National Cyber Security Centre
(NCSC) indicated cryptojacking as a “significant threat” in its
latest cyber security report [11], [12].
The use of cryptojacking as a replacement to advertisement
also has witnessed a great debate. For example, some popular
websites such as “The Pirate Bay”, among others, started
using cryptojacking as a revenue substitute to online advertise-
ment [13], [14], [15]. The Pirate Bay website later disclosed
to its users that it will be using CPU cycles of the visitors in
exchange for ads-free web browsing, garnering users approval.
As some other websites started using cryptojacking as a
revenue generation-mechanism, further debate was sparked
surrounding the ethics of using cryptojacking [16], and the
absence of user consent. Furthermore, it was later observed that
the continuous CPU-intensive mining, especially on battery-
powered devices, has resulted in the quick drainage of those
devices, adding a new variable to the debate of whether
cryptojacking is a good alternative to online advertising.
Motivated by these fast-paced and recent events, we carry
out the first in-depth study on in-browser cryptojacking and
its effects on the website visitors and their devices. We start
by analyzing and characterizing more than 5,700 websites that
have cryptojacking scripts in them. We then explore both static
and dynamic analysis tools to understand the behavioral traits
of in-browser cryptojacking scripts towards their detection.
Using various features extracted through this analysis, we build
a clustering scheme that is used to for detecting cryptojacking
scripts among benign scripts, as well as other malicious types
of JavaScript codes. We also measure the impact of in-
browser cryptojacking on user devices in terms of CPU usage
and battery drainage. Finally, in examining the feasibility of
cryptojacking as an alternative to online advertisement, we
conduct an in-depth end-to-end analysis that considers the
implications of such an alternative on both users and websites.
Contributions and Roadmap. We make the following major
contributions: 1) Using more than 5,700 websites with cryp-
tojacking scripts, we conduct the first in-depth analysis and
characterization of cryptojacking in the wild, highlighting cat-
egories and affinities, including sectors, top-level domains, etc.
(§III). 2) Using the same dataset, we conduct static analysis
of the cryptojacking scripts, to highlight distributions of cryp-
tocurrency used in cryptojacking and code (script) complexity
analysis (§IV). As an application of our static analysis, using
code complexity features we built an unsupervised clustering
system that automatically identifies cryptojacking, malicious,
and benign scripts (§IV-D). A reference-based (using ground
truth) evaluation of our clustering algorithm yielded an accu-
racy of ≈ 96%. 3) Using the same dataset, we performed
dynamic analysis to highlight the unique characteristics of
process usage, battery usage, and dynamically generated data
analysis through WebSocket inspection of cryptojacking scripts
(§V). 4) As an application of our dynamic analysis, we
explore the economic arguments made for cryptojacking as
an alternative to online advertisement, and build an analytical
model to estimate the cost of cryptojacking to the users as
well as the gain to websites conducting cryptojacking (§VI).
We supplement this analysis by contrasting it with the existing
online advertisement model. We show the economical model of
cryptojacking is impractical for benign use, and unprofitable
for malicious use. 5) We explore the limitations of existing
countermeasures and suggest more robust defense techniques
to address in-browser cryptojacking using our static and dy-
namic analysis insights (§VII).
Additionally, the rest of this paper includes a background
in §II, the related work in §VIII, discussion in §VII-C, and
concluding remarks in §IX, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the preliminaries of this work,
including an introduction to cryptocurrency, the mining pro-
cess, and cryptojacking. We then outline the problem statement
and motivation and data collection.
A. Blockchain-based Cryptocurrencies
In 2009, the first blockchain-based digital currency “Bit-
coin” was introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto [17] that involved
exchange of transactions without the use of a central authority.
In Bitcoin, the role of the trusted central authority was replaced
by a transparent and tamper-proof public blockchain that acted
as a public ledger to maintain the records of transactions.
The consensus in the decentralized peer-to-peer Bitcoin net-
work was augmented by cryptographically secure algorithm
known as the proof-of-work (PoW). Bitcoin remained the only
cryptocurrency for two years after which several more digital
currencies joined the market. As of today, there are more than
5000 cryptocurrencies have been introduced in the market [18]
with more than 5.8 million active users [19]. Bitcoin is
leading the cryptocurrency market with a 58% market share,
or ≈$4.9 Billion USD trade volume and more than 12,000
transactions per hour [20]. Towards the end of 2016, the price
of 1 bitcoin was a little under $1000 USD and during 2017
it witnessed exponential growth rising to a market price of
$19,000 USD [21]. Some other notable cryptocurrencies that
make use of public blockchain are Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple,
Monero, and Dash.
B. Mining in Cryptocurrencies
The key operations in every cryptocurrency involve ex-
change of transactions among peers, the mining of transactions
in blocks, and publishing those blocks. Computing a valid
block results in the generation of new coins in the system..
(a) Cryptojacking (b) Coinhive (c) Monero
Figure 2: Heatmap of the global distribution of Google searches for each term. Notice that US is the most prevalent country in
all three search results. Moreover there is more similarity in the search for Coinhive and Monero.
However, computing a valid block is a non-trivial process
in which miners have to solve mathematical challenges and
provide a PoW for their solutions. In Bitcoin, PoW involves
finding a nonce that, when hashed with the data in the block,
produces a hash value less than the target threshold set by
the system. The target is a function of network difficulty and
is denoted by a 256-bit unsigned integer that is encoded in
a 32-bit “compact” form and stored in the block header. In
the process of solving the challenge, miners spend effort and
in return get rewarded with 12.5 bitcoins for each valid PoW.
As more miners join, the hash power of the network and the
probability of computing a block increase. To keep the average
block computation time within the fixed range, the network’s
difficulty is adjusted every two weeks (2016 blocks).
In Equation 1, we show how the block computation time,
T (B), is affected by the hashing rate, Hr, the target, Target,
the probability of finding a block, Pr(B), and the average
number of hashes required to solve the target, H . To keep
T (B) in a fixed range (10 minutes), as the Hr increases, the
target value is adjusted to keep Pr(B) constant.
Pr(B) =
Target
2256
, H =
1
Pr(B)
, T (B) =
1
Pr(B)×Hr (1)
To maximize mining reward, multi-homed mining pools—
all participants collaboratively compute hashes based on the
hash power of their machines—have emerged. When a block
is computed, the rewards are distributed among the participants
based on their contribution towards the produced hashes.
Mining pools enable even ordinary users with limited mining
hardware to effectively participate in the mining process. As a
result of this paradigm, there has been an exponential growth in
the aggregate hash rate of the cryptocurrencies as more people
have shown interest in mining.
C. Cryptojacking
Generally, attackers utilize two main strategies for unau-
thorized use of a victim’s machine to mine digital currencies
through cryptojacking: by installing a binary on the machine,
or by using an in-browser script. The first one loads the mining
code on the victim’s machine as a stand-alone binary (or
an infection of a binary). As such, it requires information
about the target machine including its operating system and
hardware constructs. For example a malicious cryptojacking
binary developed for Windows cannot be executed on Linux.
However, the second strategy is platform agnostic, the cryp-
tojacking JavaScript is executed upon loading the website in
victim’s browser. In both cases, the mining code works in the
background while the unaware victim is using his machine.
The focus of this paper is the latter type, which we highlight
at length below. In this rest of this paper, we will refer to
the abuse case of cryptojacking, whereby an adversary injects
cryptojacking scripts to mine cryptocurrencies.
1) In-Browser Cryptojacking: In-browser cryptojacking is
done by injecting a JavaScript code in a website, allowing it
to hijack the processing power of a visitor’s device to mine a
specific cryptocurrency. Generally, JavaScript is automatically
executed when a website is loaded. Upon visiting a website
with cryptojacking code, the visiting host starts a mining
activity, by becoming part of a cryptojacking mining pool.
A key feature of in-browser cryptojacking is being platform-
independent: it can be run on any host, PC, mobile phone,
tablet, etc., as long as the web browser running on this host
has JavaScript enabled in it. JavaScript, however, is one of the
most popular web languages and, by default, is enabled in most
major browsers. Furthermore, in-browser cryptojacking allows
for mining at-scale without requiring any custom hardware: as
more visitors visit the website with cryptojacking scripts, more
processing power is available for mining.
2) Cryptojacking as a Replacement to Advertisement: An
ongoing debate sparked in the community for whether cryp-
tojacking can serve as a replacement to online advertisement.
Those advocating the approach have pointed out that users
providing their CPU power to a website for mining can use
the website without viewing online advertisements. Towards
that, some websites, including the aforementioned ‘The Pirate
Bay”, started using cryptojacking as a revenue substitute for
online advertisements [13], [14], [15] and become “ads-free
operation”. However, a counter argument to this model is the
claimed to be the excessive abuse of the cryptojacking website
to the visitor’s CPU resources. In-browser cryptojacking scripts
will not only run in the background without a user consent,
but would also drain batteries in battery-powered platforms,
would indirectly affect the user experience, and by locking the
CPU power and not allowing him to use other applications.
III. DATASET AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
With the objective of this work, as stated earlier, being
the characterization, analysis, and detection of in-browser
cryptojacking, as well as testing the economical argument for
the cryptojacking as an alternative to online advertisement, we
proceed by outlining the data collection procedure we followed
and basic characteristics. In the subsequent two sections, we
outline the static analysis and dynamic analysis we conducted
to uncover cryptojacking scripts.
Table I: Distribution of cryptojacking websites with respect to
top-level domains in our dataset.
Rank TLD Type Sites Sites%
1 .com generic 1945 34.1%
2 .net generic 359 6.2%
3 .si country 358 6.2%
4 .online generic 349 6.1%
5 .ru country 242 4.2%
6 .org generic 191 3.3%
7 .sk country 169 2.9%
8 .info generic 169 2.9%
9 .br country 157 2.7%
10 .site new 116 2.0%
11 others — 1648 28.8%
Total — — 5703 100%
A. Data Collection
We assembled a data set of cryptojacking websites pub-
lished by Pixalate [22] and Netlab 360 [23]. Pixalate is a
network analytics company that provides data solutions for
digital advertising and research. In Nov. 2017, they collected a
list of 5,000 cryptojacking websites that were actively stealing
visitors processing power to mine cryptocurrency. We obtained
that list of cryptojacking websites from Pixalate. Netlab 360
(Network Security Research Lab at 360) is a data research
platform that provides a wide range of datasets spanning
Domain Name Servers (DNS) and Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks. From Netlab 360, we obtained 700
cryptojacking websites, released on Feb 24, 2018.
The top-level domain (TLD) distribution of the combined
dataset, including the TLD type (generic, new, or country-
level) and the corresponding percentage, is shown in Table I.
While, unsurprisingly, .com and .net occupy the first and
second spot of the top-10 TLDs represented in the dataset,
with a combined total of 40.3% of the websites belong to
them, country-level domains have a significant presence, with
countries such as Slovenia, Russia, and Brazil well represented
in the dataset. New-gTLDs were also present in the top-10
gTLDs, with .site having ≈2.0% of the sites.
In the Pixalate’s dataset, 6 websites were found in the
Alexa top-5000 websites and 13 were among the Alexa top-
10000 websites. Among the cryptojacking site, 68.3% did not
have a privacy policy, while 56.8% websites had no “terms
and conditions” statement, and 49.3% did not have both the
privacy policy and the terms and conditions. This indicates
that the majority of those websites could not formally, through
those statements, inform their visitors regarding the usage of
their processing resources for mining cryptocurrencies, where
cryptojacking is used instead of online advertisement.
During our analysis we also observed that 11% of the
websites in our dataset had stopped cryptojacking, due to key
revocation by the server, removal of the code from the website,
or the closure of websites. We exclude them from our analysis.
B. Methodology
After gathering the dataset, we perform static and dynamic
analysis of the cryptojacking JavaScript code. In the static
analysis, we categorize the websites based on content and
the currency they mine during cryptojacking. We extract the
cryptojacking code and develop code-based features to ex-
amine their properties. We compare them, using those static
properties, with malicious and benign JavaScript code. We use
standard code analyzers to extract program specific features.
In our dynamic analysis, we explore the CPU power
consumed by cryptojacking websites and its effects on the user
devices. We run test websites to mimic cryptojacking websites
and carry out a series of experiments to validate our hypoth-
esis. For our experiments, we use Selenium-based scripts to
automate browsers and various end host devices, including
Windows and Linux operated laptops and an Android phone,
to monitor the effect of cryptojacking under various operating
systems and hardware architectures. For website information,
we use services provided by Alexa and SimilarWeb to extract
information regarding websites ranking, volume of traffic, and
the average time spent by visitors on those websites [24].
IV. STATIC ANALYSIS
For static analysis, we pursue three directions: content-
currency-, and code-based analysis. Content-based categoriza-
tion provides insights into the nature of websites used for
cryptojacking activities, while the currency-based categoriza-
tion shows the distribution of service providers and platforms
providing cryptojacking templates for those websites. Finally,
the code-based analysis provides insight into the complexity
of the cryptojacking scripts, using various code complexity
measures from the literature.
A. Content-based Categorization
For a deeper insight into their usage, it is important to
understand what kind of websites have cryptojacking scripts in
them. To this end, and as a first step, we categorized the web-
sites based on their contents into various categories using the
WebShrinker website URL categorization API. WebShrinker
assigns categories to websites based on the main usage of
those websites using their contents. The results are shown in
Figure 3. As it can be seen in Figure 3, miners have utilized
a wide range of categories for in-browser cryptocurrency min-
ing, including education, business, entertainment, etc. Notice
in Figure 3, some websites are categorized as “Illegal Content.”
These websites are mostly torrent websites that serve illegal
copies of movies and software. Moreover, 19% websites were
categorized as “Education” which can be attributed to the
exploitation of trust by adversaries behind cryptojacking, since
educational sites are highly trusted by their visitors [25].
B. Currency-based Categorization
To understand the cryptojacking ecosystem, it is critical
to find out what cryptocurrencies are typically being mined
through in-browser cryptojacking. Therefore, we inspected the
websites’ scripts to extract information about the platforms
and cryptocurrencies. From our dataset we found that there
were eight platforms providing templates to mine two types of
cryptocurrencies namely, Monero and JSEcoin. In Table II, we
provide details about the eight platforms and their respective
mining cryptocurrency. As a result, we found that a very
large proportion of the websites (≈81.57%) use Coinhive [6]
23% 12% 6%2%9% 2%21%1% 19%
Entertainment Adult Illegal ContentMedia
5%
Info.Tech ShoppingUncategorized BusinessSports Education
Figure 3: Categorization of websites based on the main topic of their content. Notice that most websites belong to Entertainment,
Business, and Education. A sizable chunk (12%) belonged to the Adult category.
Table II: Detailed results of currency-based analysis. 1 The
variable name is abbreviated. No CJ: No cryptojacking.
Platform Websites Cryptocurrency Websites# % # %
Coinhive 4652 81.57
Monero 4926 86.37
Hashing 67 1.17
deepMiner 56 0.98
Freecontent 39 0.68
Cryptoloot 38 0.67
Miner 38 0.67
Authedmine 35 0.61
JSEcoin 149 2.61 JSEcoin 149 2.61
No CJ 628 11.01 — 628 11.01
Total 5703 100.00 — 5703 100.00
platform to mine Monero cryptocurrency [26], which is one of
the few cryptocurrencies that supports in-browser mining. We
found that ≈86.37% of the websites in our dataset are mining
Monero cryptocurrency through seven platforms. In addition,
≈2.61% of the websites are using the JSEcoin platform [27],
which is responsible for mining the JSEcoin cryptocurrency.
Although PoW-based cryptocurrencies have many traits in
common, they may vary in terms of their market cap, user
base, application protocols, and mining rewards. In our dataset,
we found two cryptocurrencies, namely Monero and JSEcoin,
which are used for in-browser cryptojacking. In Table III, we
report the differences among the two cryptocurrencies. While
both of them are used for cryptojacking, at the time of writing
of this paper, JSEcoin was not launched in the market and did
not have any “Initial Coin Offering” (ICO), which explains its
low prevalence in our dataset. Furthermore, unlike Monero,
which is resource-intensive, JSEcoin uses minimal CPU power
and does not add a significant processing overhead to the target
device. One of the key objectives in this paper is to characterize
resources abuse in cryptocurrency mining, where Monero is
shown to be a better example than the “browser-friendly”
JSEcoin. Therefore, due to its high prevalence in dataset, and
the significant contribution towards the broader goal of this
study, we mainly focus our work on Monero cryptocurrency.
C. Code-based Analysis
We perform static analysis on the cryptojacking scripts to
analyze the performance and complexity of their code. Static
analysis reveals standard code-specific features that provide
deeper insights into the flow of information upon code exe-
cution. For static analysis, we gathered cryptojacking scripts
from all the major cryptojacking service providers found in
our dataset, such as Coinhive, JSEcoin, Crypto-Loot, Hashing,
deepMiner, Freecontent, Miner, and Authedmine. We observed
that all the service providers had unique codes, specific to their
Table III: Comparison of Moneroe and JSEcoin. JSEcoin has
not been released in the market as yet.
Currency MarketCap
Consensus
Algorithm
Resource
Intensive
Dataset
Prevelance
Monero 2.3B CryptoNight 3 86.37%
JSEcoin — SHA-256 7 2.61%
own platform. In other words, the websites using Coinhive’s
services had the same JavaScript code template across all
of them. Therefore, ≈81.57% of the websites in our dataset
were using the same JavaScript template for cryptojacking.
Similarly, all the websites using JSEcoin used the same stan-
dard template for their mining. However, the code template of
each service provider was different from one another, which
led us to believe that each script had unique static features.
With all of that in mind, we performed static analysis on the
cryptojacking websites and compared the results with other
standard JavaScript for a baseline comparison.
1) Data Attributes: We prepared our dataset for static
analysis by collecting all of the popular cryptojacking scripts
from our list of websites. We found eight unique scripts among
all the websites, each of which belongs to one of the service
providers. As a control experiment, we collected an equal
number of malicious and benign JavaScript codes to design
a clustering algorithm. Our aim was to obtain a set of features
that were unique only to the cryptojacking scripts, and aid in
their detection. With such knowledge of those features, more
accurate countermeasures can be further developed that will ac-
curately predict if a given host machine is under cryptojacking
attack. To avoid bias towards a certain class, we were limited to
include equal size of malicious and benign JavaScript samples
for the static analysis. Although there are many samples of
malicious and benign JavaScript in the wild [28], only eight
cryptojacking scripts are available in comparison. Since our
work is focused on distinguishing cryptojacking scripts from
both malicious and benign JavaScript, we had to balance the
size of each class. While the number of scripts might seem
as a limitation of our work, we believe the promise of this
work is substantial: as more currencies and platforms start
to use cryptojacking, more samples will be available for a
broader study. Demonstrating a baseline analysis to support the
argument that cryptojacking scripts are uniquely identifiable
can open for further analysis of cryptojacking scripts across
well-understood analysis tools, which we explore in this paper.
In lieu, we used the existing data of the cryptojacking web-
sites (§III-A) and online resources from GitHub for malicious
JavaScript sample [29], [30] . For benign JavaScript, we used
the set of non-cryptojacking websites and parsed their HTML
code to extract benign JavaScript code [31]. In summary, we
Table IV: Features extracted from cryptojacking, malicious, and benign samples for static analysis. The left most column shows
the title of the features in each class while the remaining columns show the features extracted from Plato. Mean ((µ)) and
Standard Deviation (σ) of the features are reported. The features obtained from these tables were used to perform correlation
analysis and FCM clustering.
Cat. Platforms M Md B D E cl T η V η1 n1 η2 n2 params sloc physical Ms
C
ryptojacking
deepMiner 184 44.2 14.1 113.0 4,810,434 4,667 267,246 554 42,533 47 2,440 507 2,227 75 416 499 67.8
Authedmine 168 26.5 19.7 82.8 4,912,255 6,096 272,903 844 59,259 41 3,247 803 2,849 73 633 784 62.8
Hashing 138 29.1 7.2 94.6 2,185,379 2,794 124,138 342 24,393 38 1,469 315 1,415 37 412 505 68.2
Miner 133 27.7 9.3 90.5 2,537,930 3,239 140,996 403 28,032 39 1,690 364 1,549 49 479 617 64.1
Coinhive 131 27.5 9.1 94.8 2,608,021 3,226 144,890 368 274,970 37 1,697 331 1,529 48 476 594 63.7
Crypto-loot 128 39.7 11.4 88.1 3,034,935 3,788 168,607 546 34,443 45 1,962 501 1,826 62 322 389 70.3
Freecontent 117 28.3 8.1 89.4 2,180,394 2,884 121,133 350 24,373 38 1,469 312 1,415 37 412 505 62.7
JSEcoin 64 17.2 10.2 62.9 1,945,165 3,257 108,064 716 30,888 45 1,878 671 1,379 49 372 412 64.7
Mean (µ) 130.3 29.9 11.3 88.9 3,026,191 3,755.1 168,121 516.4 33,925 41.3 1,981.5 475.1 1,773.6 53.8 440.3 538.1 64.9
SD. (σ) 35.9 8.4 3.9 13.8 1,180,403 1,109.9 65,577 185.1 11,856 3.9 599.3 182.8 519.3 14.8 93.2 126.3 2.8
M
alicious
20160209 92 21.5 5.6 25.1 423,925 1,833 23,551 580 16,826 27 1,032 553 801 22 427 503 44.4
20161126 62 15.3 4.2 24.6 315,735 1,563 17,540 292 12,800 17 798 275 765 0 403 481 90.5
20170110 14 4.4 15.0 26.7 1,211,305 4,704 67,294 782 45,210 15 2,740 767 1,964 232 313 564 93.6
20170507 6 24.0 5.9 11.1 199,917 1,864 11,106 777 17,897 18 942 759 922 1 25 890 71.7
20160927 3 1.4 4.0 32.5 393,555 1,575 21,864 204 12,084 13 957 191 618 0 213 98 23.2
20170322 2 18.1 11.8 7.1 253,442 3,514 14,080 1,123 35,607 9 1,762 1,114 1,752 3 11 1,738 90.9
20170303 2 8.6 0.2 9.4 8,338 147 463 63 878 13 73 50 74 4 23 55 78.7
20160407 1 33.3 0.1 2.7 207 19 11 16 76 5 12 11 7 0 3 3 78.9
20170501 1 0.9 2.1 3.3 21,464 758 1,192 322 6,314 5 431 317 327 0 105 105 35.9
20160810 1 12.5 0.5 11.9 20,148 275 1,119 70 1,685 6 255 64 20 0 8 13 60.4
Mean (µ) 18.4 14 4.9 15.5 284,803.7 1,625.2 15,822 422.9 14,938 12.8 900.2 410.1 725 26.2 153.1 445 66.9
SD. (σ) 31.9 10.5 5 10.8 364,470.8 1,508.9 20,248 374.8 15,045 6.9 834.7 372.5 686.6 72.6 171.9 543.5 24.9
B
enign
The Boat 2,135 69.3 110.8 392.0 130,285,522 31,916 7,238,084 1,364 332,361 59 17,341 1,305 14,575 852 3,084 3,349 66.7
IBM Design 2,119 68.3 110.9 397.1 132,237,213 32,018 7,346,511 1,351 332,981 59 17,393 1,292 1,4625 853 3,103 3,372 66.7
Histography 1,743 40.7 95.2 249.5 71,325,242 26,627 3,962,513 1,704 285,833 55 14,963 1,649 11,663 803 4,278 5,043 59.4
Know Lupus 1,006 28.1 92.9 170.4 47,474,425 25,120 2,637,468 2,181 278,600 54 13,424 2,127 11,696 615 3,583 4,288 65.2
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Fillipo 703 42.9 43.1 194.3 25,139,766 12,900 1,396,653 1,045 129,377 54 7,132 991 5,768 269 1,637 1,770 61.5
Leg Work 412 75.7 34.0 241.3 24,651,056 11,100 1,369,503 589 102,143 45 5,835 544 5,265 66 544 633 65.9
Code Conf 409 27.8 41.1 197.1 24,336,420 12,500 1,352,023 939 123,437 49 7,162 890 5,338 315 1,469 1,753 64.9
Louis Browns 368 35.6 21.2 106.7 6,792,400 6,529 377,355 862 63,667 51 3,393 811 3,136 68 1,034 1,357 53.3
Mean (µ) 1,049.4 48.5 65.6 236.1 52,900,430 19,049.2 2,938,912 1,216 196,814 52.1 10,428.2 1,163.9 8,621 449.1 2,217.8 2,537.1 63.4
SD. (σ) 694 17.8 33.6 92.8 44,755,377 9,151.2 2,486,409 459.8 100,856 5.3 4,999 456.7 4,165 310.3 1,225.4 1,418.2 4.3
had 8 samples of cryptojacking JavaScript samples, spanning
all the websites. Accordingly, we selected 10 malicious and 10
benign scripts for our clustering analysis (serves as a multi-
class classification).
2) Feature Extraction: We use various features that provide
insights into the structure of the code and its maintainability.
In the following, we describe the features we extracted for our
static analysis of cryptojacking, malicious, and benign scripts.
Cyclomatic Complexity. Cyclomatic complexity [32], [33]
measures the complexity of code using Control Flow Gaph
(CFG). It relies on a directed flow graph where each node
represents a function to be executed and a directed edge
between the two nodes indicates that the node representing
the function will be executed after the previous node. Let E
be the number of edges, N be the number of nodes, and Q be
the number of connected components in the CFG of a program,
then M can be used to denote the cyclomatic complexity of
the program, and is calculated as M = E + 2Q−N .
Cyclomatic Complexity Density. Cyclomatic complexity
density [34] is a measure of Cyclomatic complexity, defined
above, spread over the total code length. Usually, malware
authors obfuscate their code to avoid detection. As such,
among many other possibilities of obfuscation, they may alter
the flow of a program and add extra functions. While adding
more functions and lines of code will certainly increase the
size of the code, its complexity will remain the same, which
could be used as a feature of their detection. Let cl be the
total number of lines of code, then the cyclomatic complexity
density, denoted by Md, can be computed as Md = E+2P−Ncl
Halstead Complexity Measures. In software testing, the
Halstead complexity measures are used as metrics to char-
acterize the algorithmic implementation of a programming
language [35]. Those measures include the vocabulary η,
the program length n, the calculated program length nc, the
volume V , the effort E, the delivered bugs B, the time T ,
and the difficulty D. Let the number of distinct operators be
η1, the number of distinct operands be η2, the total number
of operators be n1, the total number of operands be n2, the
η, n, nl, V, E, and B are defined as follows:
η = η1 + η2, n = n1 + n2 (2)
nc = (η1 log2 η1) + (η2 log2 η2), V = n× log2 η (3)
D = (η1/2)× (n2/η2), E = D × V (4)
T = (D × V )/18, B = E 23 /3000 (5)
Maintainability Score. The maintainability score Ms is
calculated using Halstead volume V , cyclomatic complexity
M , and the total lines of code in the JavaScript file cl. The
maintainability score index Mi is calculated between [0-100]
and is defined as:
Ms = 171− 5.2 log(V )− 0.23M − 16.2 log(cl); (6)
Mi = max(0,
Ms
171
); (7)
Source Lines of Code. Source lines of code (SLOC) is a
measure of the lines of code in the program after excluding
the white spaces. SLOC is used as a predictive parameter to
evaluate the effort required to execute the program. It also pro-
vides insights about program maintainability and productivity.
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Figure 4: Heatmap of correlation coefficients among the features of three categorizes of JavaScript. These are the subset features
of Table IV, obtained by using algorithm 1. It can be noted that features among benign scripts appear to be highly correlated
while the features among malicious scripts remain highly uncorrelated. Correlation among the features of cryptojacking scripts
remains in the middle, relative to the other two.
Results: To extract the aforementioned features in our
code-based analysis, we used Plato, a JavaScript static analysis
and source code complexity tool [36]. For each JavaScript
code, we run Plato and record the 17 extracted features,
highlighted above, as reported in Table IV. From Table IV,
we observed that certain features, such as M , Md, V , and T ,
are clearly discriminative among all the categories. For further
analysis, in the next section we will look into the correlation
of these features among each category to see whether there is a
unique pattern among each category, which allow us to build
a clustering system that can automatically identify different
JavaScript categories based on the extracted features.
3) Correlation Analysis: Presenting individual features
among those analyzed above, while meaningful, might not
shed light on their distinguishing power given their large
numbers. To this end, we pursue a correlation analysis to
understand their patterns. In particular, we conducted a cor-
relation analysis to observe the similarity of features among
the three categorizes of scripts, the cryptojacking, malicious,
and benign. The correlation analysis showed the consistency of
the relationship distinctive to each category of the JavaScript
codes. As such, this provided us with insights into coding
patterns and features unique to the style of coding cryp-
tojacking scripts, malware scripts, and benign scripts. We
computed the correlation of the features in all the scripts
belonging to each category of JavaScript. We used the Pearson
correlation coefficient for this analysis, which is defined as
ρ(X,Y ) = Cov(X,Y )/(
√
V ar(X)V ar(Y )), where X and
Y are the random variables, V ar and Cov are the variance
and covariance of the random variables, respectively.
To identify distinguishing features and reason about their
prevalence in cryptojacking JavaScript, we performed com-
parative analysis on the correlation matrix obtained for each
class. In algorithm 1, we outline the procedure used to identify
those features. The algorithm takes as an input the correla-
tion matrix of cryptojacking C, malicious M, and benign B
Algorithm 1: Identifying Significant Features
Inputs: C, M, B;
1 i = len(C);
2 Cmean,Mmean,Bmean,Array = [];
3 for ( k = 0; k < i; k = k + 1 ) {
4 Cmean[k]← (
∑i
j=1 c(i, j)
i
;
5 Mmean[k]← (
∑i
j=1m(i, j)
i
;
6 Bmean[k]← (
∑i
j=1 c(i, j)
i
;
7 if (Cmean[k]−Mmean[k]&&Cmean[k]−
Bmean[k]) > (Mmean[k]−Bmean[k]) then
8 Array ← Cmean[k];
9 end
10 }
Output: Array
JavaScript features reported in Table IV, computes the mean
of the column vector with respect to one feature in the row,
compares the mean feature of each class, and outputs the most
distinguishing features in cryptojacking scripts that are highly
correlated within their class. The distinguishing aspect of a
feature in cryptojacking class is obtained by subtracting its
mean value from complementary mean values of features from
the other two classes, and selecting the maximum difference.
The output Array, in algorithm 1, contains a subset of
features from the total seventeen features that are unique to
cryptojacking scripts. In particular, we found eight features
and plotted their result in Figure 4. It can be observed that
cryptojacking scripts are more correlated with respect to the
cyclomatic complexity density Md and the maintainability
score Ms, while malicious and benign scripts are not as
correlated over those same parameters. From the description of
Table V: Confusion matrix and evaluation metrics of the
cryptojacking (CJ), malicious, and benign scripts’ clustering
results based on FCM clustering algorithm. Evaluation metrics’
names are abbreviated. FPR= False Positive Rate, FNR= False
Negative Rate, and AR=Accuracy Rate.
Class Benign Malicious CJ FPR FNR AR
Benign 9 0 1 10 0 90
Malicious 0 10 0 0 0 100
CJ 0 0 8 0 11.1 100
Total 3.3 3.7 96.42
those features provided in §IV-C2, deeper insights can be de-
veloped regarding the coding patterns, code complexity, CFGs,
and maintainability of cryptojacking scripts. Furthermore, high
correlation also provides a valuable insight into code contents:
that all cryptojacking scripts must be performing a sequence
of similar actions with complementary execution patterns and
information flows. We apply this understanding in our dynamic
analysis and validate it using WebSocket inspection.
D. Clustering
In this section, we build a classification system that auto-
matically recognizes cryptojacking scripts from malicious and
benign scripts based on the code complexity features alone,
which could be easily extracted from the cryptojacking scripts
and are common among a large number of cryptojacking
websites. It is desirable for our classification system to classify
scripts even with minimal information regarding the labels of
the scripts. Therefore, we utilized the Fuzzy C-Means (FCM)
clustering algorithm [37], which has the advantage of being
an unsupervised learning algorithm. In the other words, in
comparison with supervised classification algorithms, such as
the Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest (RF),
which require labels of the dataset in the training phase, FCM
has the advantage of performing well on the unlabeled dataset.
The main goal of the FCM is to group a dataset X into C
clusters in which every data point belongs to every cluster to
a certain degree. In other words, a data point that lies close to
the center of a certain cluster will have a higher membership
degree to that cluster, whereas the membership degree of the
data point that lies far away from the center of this cluster
will be lower [37]. We utilized the FCM clustering algorithm
to group the scripts to cryptojacking, malicious, and benign
clusters. In order to evaluate the performance of the clustering
experiment, we used standard evaluation metrics; the confusion
matrix, Accuracy Rate (AR), False Positive Rate (FPR), and
False Negative Rate (FNR), which are reported in Table V.
As shown in Table V, the clustering algorithm is able to
identify the scripts with high performance: AR of ≈96.4%,
FPR of 3.3%, and FNR of 3.7%. In addition, we have visual-
ized these clusters based on two major principal components
of their features which, in Figure 5, clearly show natural
separation between the clusters using the underlying features.
V. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Despite the clear benefits of the static analysis outlined
above, it is limited, and subject to circumvention through
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Figure 5: Clustering of the cryptojacking, malicious, and
benign scripts using FCM clustering algorithm.
JavaScript code obfuscation. To this end, we conduct dynamic
analysis that looks into profiling the usage of cryptojack-
ing JavaScript code of various host resources: CPU, and
battery. We then look into the characteristics of cryptojacking
in their use of network resources.
A. Resource Consumption Profiling
We conduct an extensive analysis of CPU and battery usage
of the various cryptojacking scripts.
1) Settings and Measurements Environment: We noticed
that in each cryptojacking website, a JavaScript snippet en-
codes a key belonging to the code owner and a link to a server
to which the PoW is ultimately sent. Listing 1 provides a script
found in websites that use Coinhive for mining. The source
(src) refers to the actual JavaScript file that is executed after
a browser loads the script tag. In this script, we also noticed
a throttling parameter, which is used as a mean of controlling
how much resources a cryptojacking script uses on the host.
We use such a throttling parameter, α as an additional variable
in our experiment. We experiment with α = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
To understand the impact of cryptojacking on resources
usage in different platforms, we use battery-powered machines
running Microsoft Windows, Linux, and Android operating
systems (OSes). For our experiments, we selected three lap-
tops, each with one of those OSes. The Windows laptop used
in the experiment was Asus V502U, with Intel Core i7-6500U
processor operating at 3.16 GHz. The Linux laptop was Lenovo
G50, with Intel Core i5-5200U processor (4 cores) running at
2.20 GHz, and the Android phone was Samsung Galaxy J5,
with Android version of 6.0.1.
For our cryptojacking script construction, using the various
parameters learned above, we set up an account on Coinhive
to obtain a key that links our “experiment website” to the
server. Next, we set up a test website and embedded the code
in Listing 1 within the HTML tags of the website. Finally, to
measure the usage of resources while running cryptojacking
websites, we set up a Selenium-based web browser automa-
tion and run cryptojacking websites, for various evaluations.
Selenium is a portable web-testing software that mimics actual
web browsers [38], [39].
2) CPU Usage: First, we baseline our study to highlight
CPU usage as a fingerprint across multiple websites that
Listing 1: Coinhive code found in cryptojacking sites.
<script src="./Welcome_files/coinhive.min.js">
</script>
<script>
var miner = new coinhive.Anonymous("owner key",
{throttle: 0.1});
miner.start();
</script>
employ cryptojacking using the aforementioned configurations
and measurement environment. We study the usage of CPU
with and without cryptojacking in place. For this experiment,
we select four cryptojacking websites. To measure the impact
of cryptojacking on CPU usage, we ran those websites in
our Selenium environment, for 30 seconds, with JavaScript
enabled (thus running the cryptojacking scripts) and disabled
(baseline; not running the cryptojacking scripts). We use this
test experiment as our control.
Results. We obtained two sets of results for each website,
with and without cryptojacking. In Figure 6, we plot four
test samples obtained from our experiment to demonstrate the
behavior of websites with and without cryptojacking. From
those results, we observe that when a website is loaded initially
it consumes a significant CPU power (shaded region), in both
cases. Once the website is loaded, the CPU consumption de-
cays if the JavaScript is disabled, indicating no cryptojacking.
When JavaScript is enabled, the CPU consumption is high,
indicating cryptojacking. It can also be observed in Figure 6,
that the CPU usage varied across the websites, indicating
the usage of the throttling parameter highlighted above. The
same behavior as with JavaScript disabled is exhibited when
loading a page with JavaScript that is either benign or of
other types of maliciousness than cryptojacking. Through this
experiment, we found that cryptojacking consumes anywhere
between 10 and 20 times the processing power compared to
when not using cryptojacking on the same host. To further
understand the impact of throttling on CPU usage in different
platforms, we conduct another measurement where we used
α = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} with the different testing machines. We
found a consistent pattern, whereby the relationship between
α and the CPU usage is linear, as demonstrated in Figure 7.
3) Battery Usage: Clearly, high CPU usage translates to
higher power consumption, and quicker battery drainage. To
further investigate how cryptojacking affects battery drainage,
we carried out several experiments using various α values for
the various platforms. Here we are interested in the order
of battery drainage from a baseline, rather than comparing
various platforms. The batteries of the different machines are
as follows: 65 watt-hour for Windows, 41 watt-hour for Linux
and ≈9.88% watt-hour for Android.
Results. For each α ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}, and using the different
devices, we ran the JavaScript script on a fully charged battery.
We logged the battery level every 30 seconds, as the script ran
on each device with the given α value, starting from a fully-
charged battery. Finally, we measure the baseline by running
our script without the cryptojacking code. The results are
shown in Figure 8. As expected, with α = 0.1, corresponding
to the lowest throttling and highest CPU usage, the battery
drained very quickly, to ≈10% of its capacity within 80
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Figure 6: Processor usage by four different cryptojacking
websites with JavaScript enabled and disabled. Notice that with
JavaScript enabled, the processor usage increases 10-20 times.
minutes, compared to ≈85% within the same time when not
using cryptojacking. The same result is demonstrated for both
the Linux laptop and Android phone. We also notice that
relationship between α and the battery drainage is also linear.
In examining the CPU and battery usage by cryptojacking
websites, as shown above, we highlight a clear and unique
patterns that can be used to identify those websites. We also
notice that the different operating systems do not have any
architectural support to prevent activities like cryptojacking
from happening on the device.
B. Network Usage and Profiling
Dynamic network-based artifacts are essential in analyzing
cryptojacking scripts, especially when those scripts are obfus-
cated. To this end, we also explore the network-level artifacts
to reconstruct the operation of cryptojacking services.
We noticed that during cryptojacking website execution,
the JavaScript code establishes a WebSocket connection with
a remote server and preforms a bidirectional data transfer.
The WebSocket communication can be monitored using traffic
analyzers such as Wireshark. However, a major issue when
using traffic analyzers is that browsers encrypt the web traffic
during WebSocket communication. Although significant in-
formation can still be gathered, such as source, destination,
payload size, and request timings, the actual data transferred
remain encrypted, preventing further analysis. To perform a
deeper analysis on WebSocket traffic, we examined the actual
data frames in the browser to understand the communication
protocol and payload content of WebSocket connection, for
possible analysis of cryptojacking websites, outlined below.
When a WebSocket request is initiated, the client sends an
auth message to the server along with the user information,
including sitekey, type, and user. The length of auth message
is 112 bytes. The sitekey parameter is used by the server to
identify the actual user who owns the key of the JavaScript
and adds balance of hashes to the user’s account. The server
then authenticates the request parameters and responds back
with authed message. The authed message length is 50 Bytes
and it includes a token and the total number of hashes received
so far from the client’s machine. In the authed message, the
total number of hashes is 0, since the client has not sent any
hashes yet. Then, the server sends job message to the client.
The job message has a length of 234 Bytes with a job id, blob,
and target. The target is a function of the current difficulty
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Figure 7: CPU usage recorded on three devices. Windows machine consumed more processing than the other devices during
cryptojacking. This also explains the high battery drainage in Figure 8(a).
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Figure 8: Battery usage recorded on three devices used in the dynamic analysis Notice that Windows OS is mostly affected by
cryptojacking as its aggregate battery drainage is maximum compared to Linux and Mac.
Listing 2: WebSocket frames exchanged between the client and the server
// auth request from client to server
{"type": "auth",
"params": {
"site_key": "32 characters key",
"type": "anonymous", "user": null, "goal": 0 }}
// authed response from server to client
{ "type": "authed",
"params": {
"token": "", "hashes": 0 }}
// job request sent by the server to client
{ "type": "job",
"params": {
"job_id": "164698158344253",
"blob": "152 characters blob string",
"target": "ffffff00" }}
// submit message by client to server
{ "type": "submit",
"params": {
"job_id": "164698158344253", "nonce": "
cfe539d3",
"result": "256-bit hash" }}
// hash_accept sent by server to client
{ "type": "hash_accept",
"params": {
"hashes": 256 }}
in the cryptocurrency to be mined. The client then computes
hashes on the nonce and sends a submit message back to the
server, with job id, nonce, and the resulting hash. The submit
message has a payload length of 156 Bytes. In response to the
submit message, the server sends hash accept message with
an acknowledgement and the total number of hashes received
during the session. The hash accept message is 48 Bytes
long. This is to be noted that once a webpage is refreshed,
Table VI: Types of messages exchanged between the client and
the server during cryptojacking WebSocket connection. Length
is measured in byte.
Message Source Sink Length Parameters
auth client server 112 sitekey, type, user
authed server client 50 token, hashes
job server client 234 job id, blob, target
submit client server 156 job id, result
hash accept server client 48 hashes
the WebSocket connection terminated and restarted. On the
other hand, if multiple tabs are opened in the same browser,
the WebSocket connection remains unaffected. In Table VI,
we provide details about the WebSocket connection during a
cryptojacking session. In Listing 2, we provide the the actual
data frames exchanged between the browser and the server
during WebSocket session. The data frames are structured in
“JavaScript Object Notation” (JSON).
VI. ECONOMICS OF CRYPTOJACKING
In this section, we evaluate the economic feasibility of
cryptojacking by extrapolating on the results in our dynamic
analysis. We look at the economic feasibility from the per-
spective of a cryptojacking website’s owner, intentional cryp-
tojacking, malicious cryptojacking, and website visitors. For
cryptojacking, the reward of the website owner or adversary
depends on the number of hashes produced while a website
visitor visits the website. We formulate the analysis as a fea-
sibility: how much of the energy consumed by cryptojacking
scripts (cost) is transferred to the cryptojacking website owner,
Table VII: Results of cryptojacking with different devices. Here α is the throttling parameter, h, ∆t, bn, bc, W , P , and L are
the parameters obtained from Equation 8 and Equation 9. T is the estimated time required for each device to mine 1 XMR.
Device ∆t (mins) bn(%) α h (hps) bc (%) W (W/h) P (USD) L (USD) L− P (USD) T (years)
Windows 85 82
0.1 21 10 65 6.4 ×10−4 4.5 ×10−3 3.8 ×10−3 50
0.5 14 19 65 3.1 ×10−4 3.7 ×10−3 3.4 ×10−3 104
0.9 5 57 65 4.4 ×10−5 1.6 ×10−3 1.5 ×10−3 367
Linux 71 70
0.1 26 3 41 6.6 ×10−4 5.5 ×10−3 4.8 ×10−3 40
0.5 16 22 41 4.1 ×10−4 4.2 ×10−3 3.8 ×10−3 66
0.9 5 54 41 1.3 ×10−4 2.6 ×10−3 2.5 ×10−3 214
Android 163 76
0.1 5 11 9.9 2.8 ×10−4 9.5 ×10−4 6.7 ×10−4 220
0.5 3 32 9.9 1.7 ×10−4 7.2 ×10−4 5.5 ×10−4 369
0.9 2 49 9.9 1.1 ×10−4 5.4 ×10−4 4.3 ×10−4 574
whether malicious or benign, and how that translates as an
alternative to online advertisement.
A. Analytical Model
To set a stage for our analysis, in Figure 9 we present the
results from one sample experiment conducted on Windows i7
machine with cryptojacking website set to minimum throttling
(α=0.1), indicating a maximum cryptojacking. In this figure,
the region between bs and bn is a baseline, unrelated to
cryptojacking–due to normal operation of the system. On the
other hand, the region between bn and bc is the battery drainage
due to cryptojacking. We refer to the energy loss due to such
cryptojacking as L for a given user. To formulate the cost
(to users) and benefit (to cryptojacking website), let P be the
benefit (profit) during a cryptojacking session of ∆t minutes,
and h be the hash rate of the device in hashes/second. At the
time of writing this paper, Coinhive pays 2, 894×10−8 (XMR;
currency unit) for 1 million hashes, where 1 XMR equals $200
USD. Therefore, the profit P in XMR in ∆t = tf − ts (tf and
ts refer to the finish and start time of a session, respectively)
can be computed as:
P (XMR) = (2, 894× 10−8 × h×∆t)/106 (8)
The average hash rate of our test device was 21 hashes/second,
and for the time ∆t = 85 minutes from Figure 9, the profit P
earned during the session was 3.19× 10−6 XMR or $ 6.38×
10−4 USD ($ 1.06 × 10−5 USD/second). This is the upper
bound of profit that the device can make in one battery charge.
To calculate L, corresponding to battery drainage due to
cryptojacking (bn − bc), we first measure the time it takes to
recharge 1% of the battery and denote it by tr. Therefore, the
time required to recover bn − bc can be calculated as tr ×
(bn− bc). Let W be the power consumed by the laptop to run
for one hour and C be the cost of electricity in USD/KWH.
Therefore, the loss L in USD for the use of battery during
cryptojacking can be computed using:
L(USD) = C ×W × tr × (bn − bc) (9)
For our test device, we had the following parameters: W = 65
watt-hour, C = 6.418 × 10−5 USD/(watt-hour), bn = 82%
(in Figure 9), bc = 10% and tr = 0.015 hour. Thus, the esti-
mated loss during cryptojacking session L was ≈ $4.5×10−3
USD, which is 7 times the value of P , highlighting a big gap
cryptojacking’s operation model.
Using the same analysis, we examine if cryptojacking can
be used as a source of income by users. With the same device
as above, the number of hashes required to make 1 XMR
bs
bn
bc
Figure 9: Battery drain sample of Windows i7. Here bs denotes
the starting point of the battery, bn denotes the normal 80
minutes battery drain without cryptojacking and bc denotes
the battery drain with maximum cryptojacking .
($200 USD) is 3.45×1010 hashes. Given that the same device
generates 21 hashes/second, the time required to make 1 XMR
is approximately 52 years, while the energy consumed is many
orders of magnitude more costly (note that the calculations
here are quite theoretical; to mine 1 XMR, it would take
≈321,543 battery charging cycles, each of which would cost
0.41 cent (total of ≈ 1318). In Table VII, we report all the
results obtained from the experiment for each device used in
for our experiments in the dynamic analysis, along with the
amount of time required for each device to mine 1 XMR.
B. Cryptojacking and Online Advertisement
In-browser cryptojacking is being argued as an alterna-
tive to online advertisement. To understand the soundness of
this argument, we performed an experiment to analyze and
compare the monetary value of in-browser cryptojacking as a
replacement to online advertisements.
We select Alexa’s top 10 websites [40]. For each website,
we obtained the average number of visitors and the time they
spent on those websites during March 2018. We use this
information and our model from section VI-A to measure
the potential profit those websites could have made using
cryptojacking. We assume that visitors on these websites have
the average hash rate of 20 hashes/second. We report the
results in Table VIII, highlighting that those websites would
make between $3.65 million USD (for youtube.com) and $0.10
million USD (qq.com) per month (on average).
Statista [41] publishes annual online advertisement revenue
reports. We collect the revenues generated by each of those
top-10 websites for the year 2017 (most recent report). We
Table VIII: Monthly Profit earned by top websites by applying
cryptojacking. GR denotes global rank, CR denotes the country
rank, visits are in Billions, average time duration of visits is in
mm-ss, and P-CJ is profit earned by cryptojacking and P-Ads
is revenue earned through ads. “—” denotes the revenue of the
companies that we could not find online.
Website GR CR Visits Time P-CJ P-Ads
google.com 1 1 47.09 07:23 2.41 M 7.94 B
youtube.com 2 2 26.22 20:05 3.65 M 291 M
baidu.com 3 1 19.08 08:56 1.18 M 234 M
wikipedia.org 4 6 6.55 03:51 0.17 M 160 M
reddit.com 5 4 1.69 10:38 0.12 M —
facebook.com 6 3 29.87 13:28 2.80 M 3.3 B
yahoo.com 7 7 5.21 06:19 0.22 M 250 M
google.co.in 8 1 5.33 07:46 0.29 M 1.1 B
qq.com 9 2 3.66 04:02 0.10 M —
taobao.com 10 3 1.73 06:25 0.08 M —
use those figures to examine the potential of cryptojacking as
an advertisement alternative at scale. For that, we first obtain
a monthly revenue figure for each website by dividing the
annual revenue by 12. We compare those numbers to the cryp-
tojacking alternative highlighted above. The results are shown
in Table VIII, where it can be seen that the revenue earned by
operating cryptojacking is negligible compared to the revenue
earned through online advertisements. For example, if Google
is to switch to cryptojacking, it will make $2.41 million USD
per month, at most. In contrast, Google earns ≈$7.94 Billion
USD monthly from online advertisement.
To estimate the revenue by cryptojacking websites, we
conducted the same experiment on the top-10 websites in our
dataset and computed the estimated profit earned by them,
shown in Table IX. We notice that the maximum profit, earned
by firefoxchina is ≈$2,747 USD. Although, the ad revenue for
these websites is not available online, we still suspect that
$2,747 USD per month is far too low for a website that has
87.24 million monthly views, each with an average duration
of 4 minutes and 32 seconds, as compared to the potential rev-
enues for online advertisement. Those findings are in-line with
recent reports indicating that an adversary who compromised
5,000 websites and injected his own cryptojacking scripts was
only able to make $24 USD [42].
We conclude that in-browser cryptojacking is not a feasible
alternative for online advertisement since it generates negligi-
ble revenue compared to the existing model. Also, as with most
PoW-based systems, the economical analysis of cryptojacking
as a model highlights a huge P and L negative gap, making
it impractical as a revenue source.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
In-browser cryptojacking is relatively a new phenomenon
therefore, not much attention has been paid to its use, ef-
fects and countermeasures. In this section, we will survey
the existing countermeasures available at the browser level
to prevent cryptojacking. For the existing countermeasures,
we will evaluate their usefulness by performing experiments
on our test websites. Furthermore, we will point out new
directions for effectively countering cryptojacking based on
our results and analysis.
Table IX: Estimated monthly earnings of top websites in our
dataset. Visits are in millions, average time duration of each
visit is in mm-ss and Profit P-CJ is in USD.
Website GR CR Visits Time P-CJ
firefoxchina.cn 1,088 132 87.24 04:32 2,746.9
baytpbportal.fi 1,613 591 12.16 05:36 472.9
mejortorrent.com 1,800 37 22.83 04:50 766.4
moonbit.co.in 2,761 1,289 15.68 28:37 3,116.5
shareae.com 3,331 1,071 5.86 04:49 196.0
maalaimalar.com 4,090 112 3.38 03:26 80.6
icouchtuner.to 6,084 518 7.96 02:98 200.8
paperpk.com 6,794 2,050 3.01 03:23 70.7
scamadviser.com 6,847 668 4.20 02:08 62.2
seriesdanko.to 7,253 1,452 5.44 04:59 188.2
A. Existing Countermeasures
At the browser level, existing countermeasures include web
extensions such as No Coin, Anti Miner, and No Mining [43],
[44], [45]. Each of these web extensions maintains a list
of uniform resource locators (URLs) to block while surfing
websites. If a user visits a website that is blacklisted by the
extension, the user is notified about cryptojacking. However,
we show that blacklisting is not an effective technique to
counter cryptojacking since an adaptive attacker can always
circumvent detection by creating new links that are not found
in the public list of blacklisted URLs (proxying).
To further explore that, we set up these extensions on
chrome and evaluated them on our cryptojacking test website.
All the extensions detected cryptojacking by reading the Web-
Socket requests generated by website to Coinhive. However,
in the next phase, we removed the binding key of our script
shown in Listing 1. In the absence of the key the website
establishes the WebSocket connection but does not perform
cryptojacking as it cannot verify itself with the server without
the key. However, when we tested that on the extensions, all
of them wrongly signaled the presence of active cryptojacking.
Since extension-based blacklisting does not read the data
frames exchanged between WebSockets, therefore, even the
presence of an outdated key or a broken link is falsely labeled
as cryptojacking which highlights a major limitation in the
detection approach of the existing countermeasures.
1) Evading Detection: An attacker, knowing the blacklist,
can always evade detection by setting his own third party server
to relay data to and from cryptojacking server. The cryptojack-
ing website can establish an innocuous WebSocket connection
to a third party server and send data frames and keys to the
server. Since anti-cryptojacking extensions will not have the
address of third party server blacklisted, they will not be able
to prevent the connection and cryptojacking. In Figure 10,
we show how the current countermeasures for cryptojacking
can be circumvented by an adaptive attacker. To practically
demonstrate that, we set up a test website using Coinhive script
and installed a local relay server. We installed four chrome
extensions that block the in-browser cryptojacking, namely No
Coin, Anti Miner, No Mining, and Mining Blocker. In the
first phase of the experiment, we installed the Coinhive script
and ran the website. Each extension detected the WebSocket
request and blocked it. To mimic an adaptive attacker, we
configured our relay server to act as a proxy and receive socket
wss:// *.coinhive
wss:// *.coinhive
wss:// *.coinhivewss:// *.ABC
Figure 10: Circumventing cryptojacking detection by relaying
WebSocket requests through a third party proxy server.
requests from the browser and relay them to Coinhive server.
In the Coinhive script, we modified the code and replaced the
Coinhive socket address with our server address. Next, when
we visited the website, it started cryptojacking on the client
machine and no extension was able to detect it, concluding it
is possible to circumvent detection through a relay server.
2) Countering Adaptive Attacker: To counter an adaptive
attacker and overcome the limitation of existing countermea-
sures, a better approach is message-based cryptojacking de-
tection in web extensions. Instead of blocking specific URLs,
the extensions can monitor the messages exchanged between
the user and the server during cryptojacking session. If the
messages follow the sequence of web frames that we have
illustrated in Listing 2, the extension can flag them as cryp-
tojacking. This will prevent cryptojacking even if WebSocket
requests are relayed through a third party.
To experimentally demonstrate that, we developed a
chrome web extension that detects the strings of web frames
shown in Listing 2, and notifies the user when the website
starts cryptojacking. To test our extension against the existing
countermeasures, we deployed a proxy server that relayed the
data between our test website to the dropzone server as shown
in Figure 10. We installed four chrome extensions that detect
cryptojacking: No Coin, Anti Miner, No Mining, and Mining
Blocker. Since all of these extensions take a blacklisting
approach for detection, they failed to detect cryptojacking in
the presence of the relay server. However, when we installed
our newly developed web extension, it immediately flagged
cryptojacking upon reading the actual data exchanged between
the browser and the relay server. Therefore, in our view, the
blacklisting approach is insufficient to counter cryptojacking.
In contrast, better countermeasures can be developed by deeply
inspecting the traffic exchanged between the WebSockets.
B. Long-term Countermeasures
Based on the results of our static and dynamic analysis, a
fine-grained detection tool can be built at the browser level to
address cryptojacking. As we have observed in (§V), there are
features inherent to the code of cryptojacking scripts that dis-
tinguish them form malicious and benign scripts. Moreover, the
performance of client machine during cryptojacking is unique
in comparison to the performance of the device under normal
operation. Based on these features, an accurate detection
system can be developed that can detect cryptojacking websites
during web browsing. These classifiers can be further used
by search engines and web crawlers to identify cryptojacking
websites and effectively notify the users about them, or plug
them in “safe-browsing” lists.
C. Discussion
By showing a huge negative profit/loss gap, we settle the
argument that cryptojacking is not a viable alternative for
online advertisement at the moment, and with the current cryp-
tocurrency price. Moreover, the associated negative reputation
may also be a factor to discourage users from visiting a website
that is known to perform cryptojacking on its visitors. To that
end, we do not see browser-based cryptojacking transforming
into a popular and ethical way of generating revenues for
online web service. This conclusion is also supported by the
low prevalence of cryptojacking sites among the top websites
in the world, as shown in Table IX.
Although the scope of the ethical use of cryptojacking
is limited, it is likely that the unethical use may increase
as the cryptocurrency market grows and the websites remain
vulnerable to JavaScript injection attacks. Cryptojacking might
not be a suitable revenue source for web service providers, it
however, may still provide lucrative incentives for adversaries
who can make “easy money” by compromising vulnerable
websites and targeting their visitors. Malicious website owners
may combine both cryptojacking and online advertisements to
increase their overall revenue from websites.
Results from our dynamic analysis (§V) show that cryp-
tojacking is highly resource intensive, as it causes excessive
battery drainage of the target device. As such, cryptojacking
attacks can be launched solely to abuse devices of visitors on
a specific website, thereby influencing the reputation of the
website and its ability to attract users and traffic. Therefore,
cryptojacking provides multiple attack avenues for miscreants
and we cannot ignore the potential threat of these attacks or
their likelihood of becoming more prevalent in the future.
As demonstrated in §VII-A1, the existing countermeasures
for cryptojacking, based on the blacklisting approach, can be
easily circumvented by using relay servers to proxy crypto-
jacking payload. With the increasing threat potential, and the
limitations of defense mechanisms, there is a need for strong
countermeasures in the web community to prevent websites
from becoming an attack vector for cryptojacking. Web hosting
platforms and ISPs can use the methods outlined in our static
analysis (§IV) to keep a check on the spread of cryptojacking
code across websites and notify websites’ owners and visitors.
Moreover, as a direct result of our dynamic analysis,
we argue that web browsers must shield their users from
cryptojacking by analyzing the WebSocket payload (§V) and
reporting fraudulent behavior to the users. We provide a direc-
tion towards such improved countermeasures by developing
a chrome extension that reads cryptojacking payload during
WebSocket communications, and notifies the users (§VII-A2).
With such collaborative efforts and effective defense mecha-
nisms, cryptojacking can be stalled in its early stages from
becoming a major threat in future.
VIII. RELATED WORK
In-browser cryptojacking has gained a lot of attention
recently, although not treated with any systematic study that
covers all major dimensions. In the following, however, we
review the related work.
Cryptojacking: Concurrent to this work, Ru¨th et al. [46]
(to be published in ACM IMC 2018; Fall 2018) carried out a
measurement study to observe the prevalence of cryptojacking
among websites. Towards that, they obtained blacklisted URLs
from the No Coin (§VII-A) web extension, and mapped them
on a large corpus of websites obtained from the Alexa Top
1M list. In total, they found 1491 suspect websites involved
in cryptojacking. However, as shown in §VII-A1, blacklisting
approach to detect and prevent cryptojacking has major limita-
tions, and may yield insufficient results to accurately measure
prelevance. This perhaps explains a smaller size of their dataset
(1491 sites) compared to the dataset used in our analysis (5703
sites). Concurrently, Eskandari et al. [47] also looked into
the prevalence of cryptojacking among websites and the use
of Coinhive as the most popular platform for cryptojacking.
Although these two studies, carried out in parallel to ours,
highlight the issue of cryptojacking through measurements, and
highlight the emerging use of cryptojacking as an alternative
to online ads, they, however, stop short of conducting any
code analysis towards detection, nor analyzing the economical
arguments for cryptojacking as an alternative online ads, two
directions which we pursue in detail in this paper.
Tahir et al. [48] studied the abuse of virtual machines
in cloud services for mining digital currencies. They used
micro-architectural execution patterns and CPU signatures to
determine if a virtual machine in cloud was being illegally used
for mining purposes, and proposed MineGuard, a tool to detect
mining. Bartino and Nayeem [49] highlighted worms in IoT
devices which hijacked them for mining purposes, pointing
to the infamous Linux.Darlloz worm that hijacked devices
running Linux on Intelx86 chip architecture for mining [50].
Krishnan et al. [51] studied a series of computer malware, such
as TrojanRansom.Win32.Linkup and HKTL BITCOINMINE,
that turned host machines into mining pools. Sari and Ki-
lik [52], used Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to study
vulnerabilities in mining pools with Mirai botnet as case study.
Malicious JavaScript: Malicious JavaScript code and their
impact on web browsers and client machines has been studied.
Cova et al. [53] used machine learning techniques to identify
anomalous JavaScript code in web applications. Their system
also detected obfuscated code, and generated detection sig-
natures for signature-based systems. Classification techniques
have been commonly used to detect obfuscated code that
appears benign in nature but performs malicious activities [54],
[55], [56]. Jovanovic et al. [57] used static analysis involv-
ing context-sensitive data-flow analysis to study vulnerable
points Web application programs. Vogat et al. [58] used
dynamic data tainting and static analysis to counter Cross-
site scripting (XSS) attacks involving code injection during
application launch. Tzermias et al. [59] combined static and
dynamic analysis techniques to detect malicious JavaScript
code in vulnerable PDF files. Curtsinger et al. [28] presented
a JavaScript malware detection tool called “Zozzle” that used
Bayesian classification and abstract syntax tree to identify code
elements linked to malware.
Battery Drain Attacks: Battery is a useful resource in lap-
tops and smart devices, and recently people using smart phones
have outnumbered the people using canonical PCs. As a result,
the targeted energy-based attacks on smart phone batteries have
increased. Fiore et al. [60] studied the energy-based attacks on
smart phones and their effect on the battery drainage. Martin et
al. [61] explored three major attacks namely service request
power attacks, benign power attacks, and malignant power
attacks that can be used to drain the battery of pervasive
computing devices. A number of other attacks on battery
exhaustion have been discovered in mobile phones and laptops
that exacerbate the usage of battery sensitive applications and
cause swift battery drain [62], [63].
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we take a systematic look at in-browser cryp-
tojacking through the lenses of characterization, static analysis,
dynamic analysis, and economics analysis. In order to that, we
collect a dataset of cryptojacking websites and perform static
analysis that unveils unique code complexity characteristics
and can be used to detect cryptojacking JavaScript code from
malicious and benign code samples with an accuracy of more
than 96%. We explore, through dynamic analysis, how in-
browser cryptojacking uses various resources, such as CPU,
battery, and network, and use that knowledge to reconstruct
the operation of cryptojacking scripts. We also study the
economical feasibility of cryptojacking as an alternative to
advertising, highlighting its infeasibility. By surveying prior
countermeasures and examining their limitations, we highlight
long-term solutions, capitalizing on the insights from our static
and dynamic analysis, as well as clustering findings.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Scott, “Cryptomining malware fuels most remote code execution
attacks,” Feb 2018. [Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/y9vhrq9w
[2] M. J. Zuckerman, “Microsoft blocked more than 400,000 malicious
cryptojacking attempts in one day,” Apr 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://tinyurl.com/ya6oj6wm
[3] SLM, “In-browser cryptojacking: What is it and how can you avoid
it?” Jan 2018. [Online]. Available: https://supremelevelmedia.com/
browser-cryptojacking-can-avoid/
[4] C. Cimpanu, “In-browser cryptojacking is getting harder to detect,”
Mar 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/
news/security/in-browser-cryptojacking-is-getting-harder-to-detect/
[5] B. Kerbs, “Who and what is coinhive?” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/03/who-and-what-is-coinhive/
[6] Coinhive, “Monero JavaScript Mining,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://coinhive.com/documentation
[7] N. Mathur, “Cybersecurity: Cryptojacking attacks exploded by
8,500% in 2017, says report,” Apr 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://tinyurl.com/y84alobt
[8] D. Singh, “Cryptojacking attacks rose by 8,500% globally in 2017:
report,” 2018. [Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/y9k4ug2q
[9] J. Condliffe, “A cryptojacking attack hit thousands of websites,” 2018.
[Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/ybjck22l
[10] A. D. Rayome, “Tesla public cloud environment hacked, attackers
accessed ’non-public’ company data,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://tinyurl.com/y8m79px4
[11] N. De, “UK cyber security division issues warning on pc
’cryptojacking’,” Apr 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.coindesk.
com/uk-cyber-security-division-issues-warning-on-pc-cryptojacking/
[12] NCSC, “The cyber threat to uk business 2017-2018 report,” Apr 2018.
[Online]. Available: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberthreat
[13] R. Shaikh, “The pirate bay is cryptojacking its visitors’ computers to
mine monero,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/y9s5mhce
[14] Ernesto, “The pirate bay website runs a cryptocurrency miner
(updated),” Sep 2017. [Online]. Available: https://torrentfreak.com/
the-pirate-bay-website-runs-a-cryptocurrency-miner-170916/
[15] R. Jones, “How to stop pirate bay and other sites from hijacking
your cpu to mine cryptocoins,” Sep 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://tinyurl.com/y9k4ug2q
[16] M. Zuckerman, “The ethics of cryptojacking: Rampant malware or ad-
free internet?” 2018. [Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/yd6u9h39
[17] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[18] A. Sonewane, “Top 10 cryptocurrency 2017 — best cryptocurrency
to invest,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https://atozforex.com/news/
top-10-cryptocurrency-2017/
[19] G. Hileman and M. Rauchs, “Global cryptocurrency benchmarking
study,” Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, 2017.
[20] K. Sedgwick, “21 statistics that reveal growing demand for the
cryptocurrency,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https://goo.gl/BcwAT6
[21] Blockchain, “Bitcoin block explorer,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://blockchain.info/
[22] T. Loechner, “Pixalate unveils the list of sites secretly mining cryp-
tocurrency,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/y9sbgx92
[23] X. Yang, “List of top Alexa websites with web-mining code
embedded on their homepage,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https:
//tinyurl.com/ybo6u4pf
[24] SimilarWeb, “Top websites ranking,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites
[25] A. Zarras, A. Kapravelos, G. Stringhini, T. Holz, C. Kruegel, and
G. Vigna, “The dark alleys of madison avenue: Understanding
malicious advertisements,” in Proceedings of Internet Measurement
Conference, IMC, Vancouver, Canada, Nove 2014, pp. 373–380.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2663716.2663719
[26] M. Community, “Monero cryptocurrency,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://monero.org/
[27] J. Community, “JSECoin: Digital currency - designed for the web,”
2018. [Online]. Available: https://jsecoin.com/
[28] C. Curtsinger, B. Livshits, B. G. Zorn, and C. Seifert, “ZOZZLE: Fast
and precise in-browser javascript malware detection,” in Proceedings of
the 20th USENIX Security Symposium (Security), CA, Aug. 2011.
[29] Wizsche, “Malicious javascript dataset,” https://github.com/
geeksonsecurity/js-malicious-dataset.git, 2017.
[30] H. Petrak, “Javascript malware collection,” https://github.com/
HynekPetrak/javascript-malware-collection.git, 2017.
[31] C. B. Staff, “21 top examples of javascript,” 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://tinyurl.com/y8wqarpb
[32] T. J. McCabe, “A complexity measure,” IEEE Transactions on software
Engineering, no. 4, pp. 308–320, 1976.
[33] T. J. M. Arthur H. Watson and D. R. Wallace, Structured testing: A
testing methodology using the cyclomatic complexity metric. US De-
partment of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
1996, vol. 500, no. 235.
[34] N. E. Fenton and M. Neil, “A critique of software defect prediction
models,” IEEE Transactions on software engineering, vol. 25, no. 5,
pp. 675–689, 1999.
[35] A. Serebrenik, “Software metrics,” http://www.win.tue.nl/∼aserebre/
2IS55/2010-2011/10.pdf, 2011.
[36] B. Badge, “Es-analysis/plato,” Aug 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/es-analysis/plato
[37] J. C. Bezdek, R. Ehrlich, and W. Full, “Fcm: The fuzzy c-means
clustering algorithm,” Computers and Geosciences, vol. 10, no. 2-3,
pp. 191–203, 1984.
[38] A. Bruns, A. Kornstadt, and D. Wichmann, “Web application tests with
selenium,” IEEE software, vol. 26, no. 5, 2009.
[39] S. Community, “Selenium browser automation,” 2018. [Online].
Available: https://www.seleniumhq.org/docs/
[40] Alexa, “The top 500 sites on the websites listed by their 1 month Alexa
traffic rank.” 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.alexa.com/topsites
[41] Statista, “Google: ad revenue 2001-2017,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://tinyurl.com/h4rwfyf
[42] A. Hern, “Huge cryptojacking campaign earns just $24 for hackers,”
Feb 2018. [Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/yc5xgvad
[43] R. Keramidas, “Nocoin,” Feb 2018. [Online]. Available: https:
//github.com/keraf/NoCoin
[44] Tunghobrens, “Anti miner–coin minerblock,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://tinyurl.com/ybf3jcsj
[45] N. Mining, “Secure your browser,” 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://www.nomining.com/
[46] J. Ru¨th, T. Zimmermann, K. Wolsing, and O. Hohlfeld, “Digging into
Browser-based Crypto Mining,” ArXiv e-prints, Aug. 2018.
[47] S. Eskandari, A. Leoutsarakos, T. Mursch, and J. Clark, “A
first look at browser-based cryptojacking,” in IEEE European
Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops, EuroS&P Workshops,
London, United Kingdom, Apr 2018, pp. 58–66. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW.2018.00014
[48] R. Tahir, M. Huzaifa, A. Das, M. Ahmad, C. A. Gunter, F. Zaffar,
M. Caesar, and N. Borisov, “Mining on someone else’s dime: Mitigating
covert mining operations in clouds and enterprises,” in Proceedings of
the 20th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions
and Defenses (RAID), Atlanta, GA, USA, Sep. 2017, pp. 287–310.
[49] E. Bertino and N. Islam, “Botnets and internet of things security,”
Computer, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 76–79, 2017.
[50] S. K. Bansal, “Linux worm targets internet-enabled home appliances
to mine cryptocurrencies,” Mar 2014. [Online]. Available: https://
thehackernews.com/2014/03/linux-worm-targets-internet-enabled.html
[51] V. T. V. Hari Krishnan, Sai Saketh Y, “Cryptocurrency mining–transition
to cloud,” International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and
Applications, vol. 6, no. 9, 2015.
[52] A. Sari and S. Kilic, “Exploiting cryptocurrency miners with oisnt
techniques,” Transactions on Networks and Communications, vol. 5,
no. 6, 2017.
[53] M. Cova, C. Kru¨gel, and G. Vigna, “Detection and analysis of drive-
by-download attacks and malicious javascript code,” in Proceedings of
the 19th International World Wide Web Conference (WWW), Raleigh,
NC, Apr. 2010, pp. 281–290.
[54] P. Likarish, E. Jung, and I. Jo, “Obfuscated malicious javascript detec-
tion using classification techniques,” in Proceedings of the 4th Malicious
and Unwanted Software, Quebec, Canada, Oct. 2009, pp. 47–54.
[55] Y.-T. Hou, Y. Chang, T. Chen, C.-S. Laih, and C.-M. Chen, “Malicious
web content detection by machine learning,” Expert Systems with
Applications, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 55–60, 2010.
[56] N. G. Kejriwal and P. Judge, “Method for detecting malicious
javascript,” Jul. 22 2014, uS Patent 8,789,178.
[57] N. Jovanovic, C. Kru¨gel, and E. Kirda, “Pixy: A static analysis tool for
detecting web application vulnerabilities (short paper),” in Proceedings
of the 27th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland),
Oakland, CA, May 2006, pp. 258–263.
[58] P. Vogt, F. Nentwich, N. Jovanovic, E. Kirda, C. Kru¨gel, and G. Vi-
gna, “Cross site scripting prevention with dynamic data tainting and
static analysis,” in Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, NDSS 2007, San Diego, USA, Feb 2007.
[59] Z. Tzermias, G. Sykiotakis, M. Polychronakis, and E. P. Markatos,
“Combining static and dynamic analysis for the detection of malicious
documents,” in Proceedings of the 4th European Workshop on System
Security (EUROSEC), Salzburg, Austria, 2011, p. 4.
[60] U. Fiore, F. Palmieri, A. Castiglione, V. Loia, and A. D. Santis,
“Multimedia-based battery drain attacks for android devices,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 11th Consumer Communications and Networking Con-
ference (CCNC), 2014, pp. 145–150.
[61] T. L. Martin, M. S. Hsiao, D. S. Ha, and J. Krishnaswami, “Denial-of-
service attacks on battery-powered mobile computers,” in Proceedings
of the 2nd Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom), Or-
lando, FL, 2004, pp. 309–318.
[62] B. R. Moyers, J. P. Dunning, R. Marchany, and J. G. Tront, “Effects
of wi-fi and bluetooth battery exhaustion attacks on mobile devices,” in
Proceedings of the 43rd Hawaii International International Conference
on Systems Science (HICSS), Kauai, HI, 2010, pp. 1–9.
[63] T. K. Buennemeyer, M. Gora, R. C. Marchany, and J. G. Tront, “Battery
exhaustion attack detection with small handheld mobile computers,”
in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Portable
Information Devices, 2007, pp. 1–5.
